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 ABSTRACT   
 
Alexithymia is a multifaceted personality construct related to deficits in the recognition 
and verbalization of emotions. It is uncertain what causes alexithymia or which stage of 
emotion processing is first affected. The current study was designed to determine if 
trait alexithymia was associated with impaired early semantic decoding of facial 
emotion. Participants performed the Emostroop task, which varied the presentation 
time of faces depicting neutral, angry, or sad expressions before the classification of 
angry or sad adjectives. The Emostroop effect was replicated, represented by slowed 
responses when the classified word was incongruent with the background facial 
emotion. Individuals with high alexithymia were slower overall across all trials, 
particularly when classifying sad adjectives; however, they did not differ on the basic 
Emostroop effect. Our results suggest that alexithymia does not stem from lower-level 
problems detecting and categorizing others’ facial emotions. Moreover, their 
impairment does not appear to extend uniformly across negative emotions and is not 
specific to angry or threatening stimuli as previously reported, at least during early 
processing. Almost in contrast to the expected impairment, individuals with high 
alexithymia and lower verbal IQ scores had even more pronounced Emostroop effects, 
especially when the face was displayed longer.To better understand the nature of 
alexithymia, future research needs to further disentangle the precise phase of emotion 
processing and forms of affect most affected in this relatively common condition 
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RESUMEN     
 
La alexitimia es un constructo de personalidad multifacética relacionada con déficit en 
el reconocimiento y la verbalización de las emociones. No se sabe qué causa la 
alexitimia o en qué etapa de procesamiento de las emociones se ve afectada primero. 
El presente estudio fue diseñado para determinar si el rasgo de  alexitimia se asocia 
con una deficiencia en la decodificación semántica temprana de la emoción facial. 
Los participantes realizaron la tarea Emostroop, que varió el tiempo de presentación 
de las caras que representan expresiones neutrales, de enojo o de tristeza antes de 
la clasificación de los adjetivos de enojo y de tristeza. El efecto Emostroop se repitió, 
representado por las respuestas lentas cuando la palabra clasificada era 
incongruente con el antecedente de la emoción facial. Las personas con alta 
alexitimia eran en general más lentas en todos los ensayos, sobre todo al clasificar 
adjetivos tristes; sin embargo, no fue diferente en el efecto básico Emostroop. 
Nuestros resultados sugieren que la alexitimia no se debe a problemas de bajo nivel 
de detección y categorización de las emociones faciales de los demás. Además, su 
discapacidad no parece extenderse uniformemente a través de las emociones 
negativas y no es específico a los estímulos de enojo o amenaza como se informó 
anteriormente, al menos durante el proceso inicial. Casi en contraste con el deterioro 
esperado, los individuos con alta alexitimia y puntuaciones inferiores de CI verbal 
tuvieron efectos Emostroop aún más pronunciadas, especialmente cuando se 
muestra la cara por más tiempo. Para entender mejor la naturaleza de la alexitimia, la 
investigación futura debe separar aún más la fase precisa de procesamiento de las 
emociones y de las formas de afectar a los más afectados en esta condición 
relativamente común. 
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Alexithymia is a multifaceted, personality 
construct characterized by multiple interrelated issues, 
including a reduced ability to identify, describe, and 
express emotional feelings, difficulty distinguishing 
feelings from sensations like arousal, and a tendency to 
focus on external over inner events (Nemiah, 
Freyberger, & Sifneos, 1976; Taylor, 1984). Despite 
being a subclinical phenomenon, it is also often 
accompanied by multiple psychosomatic and 
psychiatric disorders such as anxiety, depression, 
fibromyalgia, and chronic gastrointestinal distress 
(Taylor, 2000). It is currently unclear what causes 
alexithymia or the mechanisms by which it affects 
emotion processing, but it is widely agreed that these 
individuals suffer from a deficit in the cognitive 
processing and regulation of emotion (Parker, Taylor, & 
Bagby, 1993a). For example, alexithymia is inversely 
related to emotional intelligence (Parker, Taylor, & 
Bagby, 2001) and it affects the processing of one’s own 
emotions as well as the ability to recognize emotions in 
words or others’ faces (e.g. Gil et al., 2009; Lane et al., 
1996; Lane, Sechrest, Riedel, Shapiro, & Kaszniak, 
2000; Parker et al., 1993a; Parker, Taylor, & Bagby, 
1993a; Prkachin, Casey, & Prkachin, 2009; Suslow & 
Junghanns, 2002; Vermeulen, Luminet, & Corneille, 
2006). 
Despite these effects, which have been 
observed across types of stimuli and levels of 
processing, most researchers assume that alexithymia 
is associated with higher-level cognitive problems 
linked to one’s ability to think about emotions, such as 
differentiating or translating nonverbal feelings into 
verbal or abstract concepts (e.g., see Holt, 
1995; Taylor, Bagby & Parker, 1997). For example, 
individuals with high levels of alexithymia are impaired 
at communicating subjective feelings in words (Taylor 
et al., 1997) and only weakly associate their own bodily 
sensations during emotional arousal with words (Bucci, 
1997). Similarly, individuals with high alexithymia are 
impaired at recall but not recognition for previously 
presented emotional words (Luminet, Vermeulen, 
Demaret, Taylor, & Bagby, 2006). Moreover, 
alexithymia is associated in development with delayed 
speech (Kokkonen et al., 2003) and the emotion 
recognition impairments in alexithymia are sometimes  
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eliminated after verbal IQ is taken into account 
(Montebarocci, Surcinelli, Rossi, & Baldaro, 2011). 
However, whether alexithymia is specifically a semantic 
or conceptual problem is difficult to confirm because 
almost all tasks that measure basic emotion-processing 
impairments require verbal responses and rarely 
control for verbal IQ. Moreover, the instrument most 
often used to measure alexithymia (the TAS-20, Bagby, 
Parker & Taylor, 1994) is a simple self-report 
questionnaire that may produce spurious data, not only 
because it is a verbal measure and one that is subject 
to self-reporting biases (Mueller, Alpers, & Reim, 2006), 
but also because the subscale that most often predicts 
impairment (“difficulty describing feelings”) also taps 
the degree to which people feel shame about their 
emotions (Suslow, Donges, Kersting, & Arolt, 2001)—
the latter of which could cause people to inhibit, ignore, 
and fail to report emotions even if they were capable of 
doing so. 
Other researchers assume that alexithymia 
results from more basic emotion-processing 
impairments that are not necessarily explicit, 
conceptual, or verbal, but may pertain more to negative 
states. However, the results from these studies are 
highly mixed as they sometimes extend to positive 
emotions and other times only occur for specific 
negative states. For example, in a PET brain imaging 
study, individuals with alexithymia had reduced brain 
activity in multiple regions for angry and sad faces 
compared to neutral, but not happy (Kano et al., 2003). 
The insula and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)—which 
represent subjective pain states that increase with 
alexithymia—were also uniquely underactivated in the 
PET study during angry compared to neutral faces 
(Kano et al., 2003). Alexithymia has been associated 
with reduced activity in the amygdala to masked sad 
(but not happy) faces, even after controlling for trait 
anxiety and depression (Kugel et al., 2008; Reker et al., 
2010). However, other neural regions besides the 
amygdala also show reductions in brain activity in 
alexithymia that extend to happy faces (Reker et al., 
2010). Another study replicated the reduced activity in 
the right amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex 
(MPFC) in alexithymia, but the effects were only 
significant for disgust and did not occur during anxiety-
producing images (Leweke et al., 2004). Thus, 
individuals with alexithymia clearly have different 
psychological and neural processes for affective 
stimuli, even when they are not verbal, but these 
impairments may or may not be specific to negative 
states. 
Priming studies have helped demonstrate that 
deficits in alexithymia extend to earlier phases of 
emotion processing, which are not necessarily under 
conscious control, particularly during speeded 
processing (Parker, Prkachin, & Prkachin, 
2005; Prkachin et al., 2009). Individuals with 
alexithymia show differences in the degree to which 
they are distracted by emotional primes when 
categorizing nonaffective stimuli (as in clinical 
emotional Stroop tasks) or show facilitation 
(interference) from rapidly presented emotional primes 
when categorizing congruent (incongruent) stimuli (as 
in affective priming tasks or the current Emostroop 
task). However, these effects also require verbal 
processing and results have been extremely mixed. 
Sometimes individuals with high alexithymia only show 
facilitation for positive and not negative prime-target 
pairs (Suslow, 1998), sometimes the opposite occurs 
(Suslow, Junghanns, Donges, & Arolt, 2001), and 
sometimes neither facilitation or interference is 
affected, but individuals with alexithymia show faster 
responses when the emotional prime is incongruent 
with the target (Suslow & Junghanns, 2002).In a 
carefully controlled series of three studies comparing 
priming effects from words or faces (positive, negative, 
or neutral) on the classification of words or faces 
(positive or negative), the only effect observed was a 
reduced priming effect in alexithymia from angry faces 
(Vermeulen et al., 2006). The authors interpreted this 
effect as evidence that alexithymia reflects a specific 
inability to process threat cues or to marshal 
appropriate bodily states after their detection. However, 
sad primes were not significantly different from angry 
primes in this study, and they were marginally related 
to alexithymia scores across their experiments (p 
= .06; Vermeulen et al., 2006). Moreover, in clinical 
studies alexithymia is highly associated with 
somatization (Kano, Hamaguchi, Itoh, Yanai, & Fukudo, 
2007), which is inconsistent with an inability to generate 
bodily states from external situations.  
Others have also proposed that alexithymia 
reflects a problem processing threat, based on results 
from clinical emotional Stroop tasks in which 
participants label the ink color of words of varying 
valence. In one study, individuals with high alexithymia 
showed less interference from emotionally-arousing 
words (Martínez-Sanchez & Serrano, 1997). In another, 
patients with high alexithymia were less distracted by 
emotional words that did slow performance for patients 
with low alexithymia, with effects increasing from 
positive to negative to bodily-symptom words (only the 
last category being significant). This reduced distraction 
from emotional words occurred despite the fact that  
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individuals with high alexithymia rated the words 
similarly and the researchers factored out other 
relevant trait variables (Mueller et al., 2006). These 
authors agreed with Vermeulen and colleagues (2006) 
that alexithymia was associated with impaired threat 
processing, but acknowledged that alexithymics could 
be so sensitive to threat that it is no longer distracting 
or conversely could be too insensitive to threat, causing 
somatic disorders due to chronic dismissal of key 
internal cues (see also Martin & Pihl, 1985). This latter 
interpretation is again inconsistent with the fact that 
alexithymics show increased subjective distress to 
physical pain and present as hypochondriatic (Kano et 
al., 2007). Adding to the confusion, prior studies found 
that interference to arousing sexual words was greater 
in individuals with high alexithymia (Parker, Taylor, & 
Bagby, 1993b) or they were neither more nor less 
affected by emotionally arousing words (Lundh & 
Simonsson-Sarnecki, 2002). Therefore, there is some 
indication that alexithymia is associated with reduced 
automatic processing of negative states—perhaps 
particularly anger—but the results and their meaning 
are far from clear.  
The current framework assumes that emotional 
stimuli are categorized into fine-grained emotional 
concepts with semantic labels early in processing (see 
review in Preston and Hofelich, 2012). For example, in 
the Emostroop task, when typical adults view another’s 
angry facial expression, even when the face is 
irrelevant to their task, they spontaneously categorize 
the face as angry and activate the semantic label 
(“angry”), which in turn facilitates (interferes) with 
classification of congruent (incongruent) foreground 
words (Hofelich & Preston, 2012; Preston & Stansfield, 
2008). In this model, the association of affective stimuli 
with semantic labels is an early, spontaneous, and 
necessary phase of emotion recognition, even when it 
is not required for the task. Any impairment in this 
semantic decoding would in turn influence all 
downstream emotion processing and discrimination of 
others’ states. Because of this feature, the Emostroop 
task could be applied to alexithymia to determine if their 
impairment emanates from this early phase of semantic 
decoding. If they do not, alexithymia could still stem 
from disorder-relevant biases introduced later in 
processing during the conscious recall, rumination, and 
reflection upon activated states, for example because 
of an inability to distinguish physiological from affective 
feelings or to avoid unpleasant or shameful feelings.  
Emostroop performance needs to be 
examined, even though automatic responses have 
already been studied with color-naming emotional 
Stroop and affective priming tasks (above). The 
Emostroop task does not measure distraction from 
personally-relevant emotions like clinical Stroop tasks, 
but rather directly measures the extent to which people 
spontaneously decode nonverbal facial emotion into 
semantic categories—a process that is known to 
support basic emotion recognition. In addition, the 
Emostroop task does not simply measure effects of 
valence, like affective priming tasks do, because the 
semantic interference can be linked to particular basic 
emotions—a feature Vermeulen and colleagues (2006) 
previously called to be examined. Moreover, the 
Emostroop task can be modified to examine effects 
across a range of perceptual speeds, from brief and 
minimal awareness to full conscious perception.  
To systematically investigate the point in 
processing where semantic encoding and relevant 
impairments emerge, we modified the Emostroop task 
to present the faces for different durations of time. To 
test the hypothesis from priming studies that the 
impairment in alexithymia is specific to threat or anger, 
we measured responses to anger, sadness, and 
neutral affect, assuming that sad faces are not normally 
considered threatening or threatened per se. Positive 
emotions were omitted here because they are less 
often implicated in alexithymia and removing them 
permitted more trials per remaining condition. 
Alexithymia was measured with the Toronto 
Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) (Bagby et al., 1994), a 
widely used scale with good reliability, validity, and 
generalizability (Taylor, Parker, & Bagby, 2003). To 
control for possible confounding variables, we also 
measured trait depression, anxiety, and verbal ability 
(Hendryx, Haviland, & Shaw, 1991). 
Overall, we expected to replicate the 
Emostroop effect when the faces were consciously 
processed but perhaps not at the shortest presentation 
intervals, when valence information alone is more likely 
to be available. We also expected individuals with high 
alexithymia to have slower responses when 
categorizing negative emotions, consistent with prior 
research (Lane et al., 2000; Parker et al., 1993a). 
However, we did not necessarily expect them to have 
impaired Emostroop interference effects, or effects 
specific to anger, since most of the prior literature 
pointed to problems in alexithymia with managing 
multiple, subjectively-arousing feeling states online, 
rather than a basic intellectual problem decoding and 
labeling threatening emotions. 
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2.1. Participants 
One hundred and fifteen undergraduate 
students (65 female, 50 male) from a Midwestern 
university in the United States participated in the study 
for course credit. The sample size was selected to 
match representative prior studies using the TAS-20 
(e.g., Prkachin et al., 2009) and the Emostroop Task 
(e.g., Preston & Stansfield, 2008). The average age 
was 18.95, with a range between 18 and 26. Most of 
the participants were freshman students (Freshman 
75%, Sophomore 17%, Junior 2%, Senior 6%) and the 
majority was Caucasian (African-American 4%, Asian 
15%, Caucasian 75%, Hispanic 4%, Other 1%). 
Participants were prescreened from a pool of 
introductory psychology course students using 
questions from the 7-item TAS-20 Difficulty Identifying 
Emotions Subscale (Bagby et al., 1994), in order to 
recruit comparable numbers of high and low 
alexithymia scorers. Students with TAS-20 Difficulty 
Identifying Emotions subscale scores that were at least 
1.5 SD above or below the total subject pool’s mean of 
14 were recruited to participate, to ensure good 
coverage of higher and lower distribution participants. 
High and low alexithymia scorers were grouped for 
analyses using a median split on their overall TAS-20 
scores. Four participants were dropped from the study 
for not completing the task or having a median reaction 
time over 4 SD. 
 
2.2. Procedure 
 Participants were tested in a computer room in 
groups of one to 12 individuals. After giving their 
informed consent via a paper form, each subject 
completed the computerized task followed by online 
questionnaires. The computerized task consisted of a 
practice block to familiarize participants with the 
response keys (sad/angry). Then, in random order, 
participants completed the Emostroop task, a facial 
emotion identification task, and a word emotion 
identification task. Written instructions were provided 
on a piece of paper and on the computer screen. The 
online questionnaires included the TAS-20 (Bagby et 
al., 1994), the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck & 
Steer, 1987), the Extended Range Vocabulary Test 
(Educational Testing Service, 1976), and the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983). Participants 
were then debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
2.3. Tasks 
Emostroop task.The Emostroop stimuli were as 
reported previously (Preston & Stansfield, 2008). The 
stimuli first appeared as in the classic Emostroop task 
with emotion words superimposed over pictures of 
facial emotion created using Adobe Photoshop (Adobe 
Systems Inc., San Jose, CA). However, this time, each 
picture of facial emotion was visible for a varying 
amount of time before being replaced by a scrambled 
face mask, with the overlaid word to be classified still 
visible above the mask until the participant responded. 
The faces were visible before the mask in eight 
different presentation time bins (16.667 ms, 33.333 ms, 
83.333 ms, 100 ms, 150 ms, 200 ms, 300 ms, 400 ms), 
selected in randomized order without replacement. 
Twenty-four trials appeared in each bin. The facial 
stimuli were one of 16 Pictures of Facial Affect 
(PFA; Ekman & Friesen, 1976).  
The stimuli consist of four actors (two male) 
displaying one of three expressions (sad, angry, or 
neutral). The overlaid words were six prototypical sad 
or angry adjectives (Table 1). A word was randomly 
selected for each trial. The neutral category was used 
to examine facilitation effects and only applied to facial 
expressions (there were no neutral words). Of the 192 
trials, the background facial emotion matched the word 
one-third of the time (congruent trials), and of the 
remaining trials, half of the time the word was overlaid 
on a different facial emotion (incongruent emotional 
trials), and half of the time on a neutral face 
(incongruent neutral trials). All four actors were 
randomly selected within each time bin and 
combination without repetition. Subjects categorized 
the emotion of the adjective as sad or angry as quickly 
and as accurately as possible, using their index fingers 
on both hands on keyboard buttons that were labeled 
with stickers “S” (for sad) or “A” (for angry). Accuracy 
feedback was provided after each trial using a green 
(correct) or red (incorrect) border. 
 
Table 1.Emotion adjectives used in study 
Angry Words Sad Words 
Hostile Depressed 
Hateful Hopeless 
Furious Sorrowful 
Outraged Miserable 
Enraged Grieving 
Angry Sad 
 
 
For all analyses, error trials and trials with 
reaction times (RT) over 2.5 standard deviations 
greater than each participant’s mean RT were first  
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removed before calculating their median RT for 
congruent, incongruent emotional, and incongruent 
neutral trials for each of the eight presentation time 
bins. The basic Emostroop effect was calculated by 
subtracting median reaction times for the congruent 
trials from the median reaction time for the incongruent 
emotional trials within each subject.  
 
Face and word tasks.For the separate word-only 
and face-only blocks, the same angry and sad faces or 
words were displayed. No neutral faces were included 
in the face-only block. Participants responded to a total 
of 16 trials for the faces-only block (each picture was 
viewed twice) and 24 trials for the words-only block 
(each word was viewed twice). The words and faces 
were displayed in a randomized order. Again, 
participants categorized the emotion using their index 
fingers on both hands by pressing buttons S or A 
marked on the keyboard, followed by accuracy 
feedback. 
 
2.4. Measures 
TAS-20.The Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-
20) (Bagby et al., 1994) is one of the most commonly 
used self-report measures of alexithymia. The TAS-20 
includes three subscales: (1) Difficulty Identifying 
Feeling (e.g., “when I am upset, I don’t know if I am 
sad, frightened, or angry”), (2) Difficulty Describing 
Feelings (e.g., “I find it hard to describe how I feel 
about people”), and (3) Externally Oriented Thinking 
(e.g., “I prefer talking to people about their daily 
activities rather than their feelings”). The scale is 
comprised of 20 items. Items are rated using a 5-point 
Likert scale whereby 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = 
strongly agree. The total alexithymia score is the sum 
of responses to all 20 items. In our study, the average 
TAS-20 score for participants was 47.64 (SD = 12.04) 
and the median was 47, which is below the level 
considered alexithymic (61 or above is alexithymic, 52 
to 60 is possibly, 51 or below is not; Bagby et al., 
1994). Due to the low number of participants scoring 61 
and above (n = 19), the median-split was used during 
analyses (29 participants scored in the middle range).  
Of the 56 participants that fell into the upper half of the 
distribution (the high alexithymia group), 19 had scores 
at or above the 61 TAS-20 alexithymia cut-off score. All 
59 participants that fell into the lower half of the 
distribution (the low alexithymia group) had TAS-20 
scores of 51 or below. There was no significant 
difference in the TAS-20 scores of male (M = 48.10) 
and female (M = 47.29) participants, (t(113) = .36, p 
= .723), so gender was not included in subsequent 
analyses. 
STAI. To measure anxiety, we used the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Spielberger, 1983). 
Respondents used a four-point Likert scale ranging 
from not at all (1) to very much so (4). This measure 
includes the same 20 items that are assessed for both 
the degree to which participants experience the 
emotion typically (trait anxiety) and are currently 
experiencing that emotion (state anxiety). 
BDI-II. To measure depression, we used a 21-
item Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) (Beck & Steer, 
1987). Items are rated on a four-point Likert scale 
ranging from (0) to severe (3). One question regarding 
suicide was eliminated due to human subjects 
concerns.  
ERVT. The Extended Range Vocabulary Test 
(ERVT, Version 3; Educational Testing Service, 1976) 
was administered to measure verbal ability or verbal 
IQ. This 48-item measure tests participants’ knowledge 
of word meaning. For each item, participants were 
asked to select one of five words with the same or 
nearly the same meaning as the given word. 
 
 
 
3.1. Ability to categorize the basic emotion of 
faces and words alone 
There were no differences between high and 
low alexithymia groups on the RT to classify either 
emotional words (F(1, 113) = 3.37, p = .069) or 
emotional faces alone (F(1, 113) = .10, p = .749), or for 
specific emotions (angry and sad) within the words-only 
block (F(1, 113) < 2.4, p> .1) or the faces-only block 
(F(1, 113) < .2, p> .6). Therefore, there was no reason 
to assume that any impairment in the Emostroop task 
emanated from trouble understanding the stimuli or 
classifying basic facial or word emotions during 
unspeeded, conscious perception. 
 
3.2. Replicating the emostroop effect across 
participants 
3.2% of the trials were removed due to error 
and 2.9% of trials were eliminated because they were 
greater or less than 2.5 SD from the participant’s RT 
mean. Error rates did not differ significantly by time bin 
(F(7, 22840) = .94, p = .473) or by alexithymia status  
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(F(1, 113) = 1.24, p = .268). Overall, reaction times 
(RT) were significantly slower for incongruent than 
congruent trials, which replicates the basic Emostroop 
effect, F(1, 114) = 14.95, p< .001. A repeated-
measures ANOVA using Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction further indicated differences in median RT 
across the three trial types (congruent, incongruent 
emotional, incongruent neutral), F(1.57, 178.49) = 
11.22, p< .001. Neutral trials (M = 729.94, SD = 
158.25) were nonsignificantly intermediate between the 
shorter congruent (M = 723.40, SD = 151.77) and 
longer incongruent (M = 737.97, SD = 174.67) trials, 
using post hoc tests with Bonferroni correction. An 
additional ANOVA using Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction found no differences in performance based 
on the specific emotion of the word, F(1, 114) = .2.09, p 
= .151, or face, F(2, 222.01) =  .38, p = .681; however, 
word and face emotion interacted, which again simply 
reflects the replicated Emostroop effect, F(1.88, 
214.77) = 5.04, p = .008. 
 
3.3. The duration to decode semantic facial 
emotions across participants 
Every time bin showed the Emostroop effect in 
the predicted direction (incongruent RTs longer than 
congruent), but the observed effect sizes differed non-
monotonically across time bins. From the shortest to 
longest time bins, effect sizes were 16.667ms d = 
0.099; 33.333ms d = 0.018; 83.333ms d = 0.260; 
100ms d = 0.088; 150ms d = 0.186; 200ms d = 0.080; 
300ms d = 0.158; 400ms d = 0.112. These data are 
consistent with the hypothesis that the Emostroop 
effect is present at all time bins. The 95% confidence 
intervals for all effect means overlapped across all time 
bins between the highest lower bound (10ms in the 
83.333ms time bin) and the lowest upper bound (32ms 
in the 200ms time bin). While both groups had a peak 
Emostroop effect between 83.33 and 100ms, and the 
smallest observed effect size (d = 0.018) occurred at 
the second shortest (33.333ms) time bin, even the very 
shortest time bin (16.333ms) generated a moderately 
large effect (d = 0.099) comparable to several of the 
longer time bins; this suggests that the Emostroop 
effect does not require significant processing time. 
However, a test of the Emostroop effect performed 
separately within each time bin was not significant for 
the shortest bins (16.67ms and 33.33ms), which is not 
surprising given that we had 80% power to detect a d of 
0.264, roughly double the mean observed effect size 
across all time bins (d = 0.125). 
3.4. Effects of High or Low Alexithymia on the 
Emostroop Effect 
Repeated-measures ANOVA using 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used to compare 
the Emostroop effect between time bins and between 
high and low alexithymia groups. Overall, the high 
alexithymia group performed the task more slowly than 
the low alexithymia group (F(1, 20851) = 169.533, 
p< .000). However, the Emostroop effect did not differ 
by alexithymia group (F(1, 113) = .115, p = .736). In 
addition, there was no significant interaction between 
time bin and alexithymia group in predicting the 
Emostroop effect (F(5.23, 590.76) = 1.65, p = .141). 
Within the low alexithymia group, the Emostroop effect 
tended to be stronger in some time bins (F(4.79, 
277.92) = 2.08, p = .071), with greater effects in 
intermediate (83.33ms, B = 48.89, p = .005) and longer 
(300ms, B = 37.14, p = .017) duration bins. This pattern 
was similar in the high alexithymia group, with similar 
peaks in the intermediate (100ms, B = 47.42, p = .038; 
150ms, B = 28.80, p = .074), and longer (400ms, B = 
30.69, p = .067) time bins; however, this difference was 
not significant due to the amount of noise across high 
alexithymia participants (F(4.58, 252.06) = .43, p 
= .809) (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. 
 
Emostroop effect (Incongruent RT - Congruent RT) for low and high 
alexithymia groups by time bin in milliseconds (ms). Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean.  
 
Including trait covariates.The high alexithymia group 
had significantly lower verbal IQ scores on the ERVT 
(M = 10.08, SD = 8.89) than the low alexithymia group 
(M = 13.91, SD = 8.21), t = 2.40, p =.018. The high 
alexithymia group also had significantly higher BDI-II 
scores (M = 18.68, SD = 11.28) than the low 
alexithymia group (M = 5.00, SD = 4.87), t = 8.52,  
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p< .000 and higher STAI scores (M = 96.82, SD = 
18.20) compared to the low alexithymia group (M = 
66.29, SD = 15.78), t = 9.59, p< .000. After adding 
ERVT as a covariate, the interaction between time bin 
and alexithymia group on the Emostroop effect was 
marginally significant (F(5.19, 581.75) = 1.99, p = .075), 
because lower verbal IQ scores within the high 
alexithymia group conveyed (unexpectedly) greater 
Emostroop effects, especially at intermediate and 
longer time bins (overall r(54) = -.29, p = .033; 
83.33ms, 300ms, & 400ms bins r(54) < -.22, p< .106). 
This indicates that even when verbal IQ is 
compromised, individuals with high alexithymia are not 
impaired at decoding irrelevant background faces; 
indeed, they appear to be—if anything—encoding them 
more strongly. BDI-II scores and STAI scores produced 
similar but nonsignificant effects (BDI-II: F(5.13, 
569.47) = 1.71, p = .103; STAI: F(7, 571.74) = 1.38, p 
= .228). 
Specific Emotions. While differences in RT among high 
and low alexithymia groups are not apparent when 
contrasting congruent and incongruent trials, deficits 
may appear for specific emotions. Examining the effect 
of different face prime and target word emotion 
combinations on RT with an independent-samples t-
test, the high alexithymia group was significantly slower 
when responding to sad words that followed sad or 
angry facial emotion primes. The high alexithymia 
group responded slower than the low alexithymia group 
on congruent trials with sad primes followed by sad 
words (high M = 745.84, low M = 698.28; t = 2.11, p 
=.037) or on incongruent emotional trials with angry 
primes followed by sad words (high M = 766.79, low M 
= 724.64; t = 2.39, p =.019). 
 
 
 
Alexithymia has been linked to deficits in the 
cognitive processing and regulation of emotion (Parker 
et al., 1993a), but the point in processing at which the 
impairment emanates, and which emotions are most 
affected, is unclear. The current study administered the 
Emostroop task (Hofelich & Preston, 2012; Preston & 
Stansfield, 2008), with varying durations of exposure to 
irrelevant sad, angry, and neutral facial expressions. 
The goal was to determine how long it takes for people 
to spontaneously process the semantic category of a 
specific emotional expression, as well as to determine if 
any differences in Emostroop performance correlated 
with trait alexithymia. We also added a basic word and 
face classification task using the same stimuli to ensure 
that any difficulties on the Emostroop task did not stem 
from more fundamental problems identifying or 
recognizing the stimuli. 
We replicated the basic Emostroop effect 
across participants, with longer response times to trials 
where the facial emotion was incongruent compared to 
congruent with the emotion of the word to be 
categorized. Our facial emotion pictures were shown in 
time bins ranging from subliminal (~30ms) to 
supraliminal (> 200ms) (Tsuchiya & Adolphs, 2007). 
Despite this range, we did not observe significant 
differences in the Emostroop effect across time bins. 
However, the mean effect for both high and low 
alexithymia groups was larger during intermediate 
(83.33 or 100ms) and longer time bins (300 or 400ms), 
compared to the other intervals. It is possible that 
semantic facial decoding peaks in waves, such as 
when information first arrives in the visual and ventral 
temporal cortices and again after full processing has 
occurred along the entire cortex (Pessoa & Adolphs, 
2010). From the graph in Figure 1, these peaks appear 
to occur slightly earlier for low alexithymia individuals, 
but these omnibus group effects and interactions are 
not significant, with groups only differing statistically 
within those bins. 
Individuals with high alexithymia in our sample 
were not impaired at classifying the non-verbal basic 
emotion of sad or angry facial expressions or the more 
verbal adjectives when the stimuli were presented 
alone and with unlimited time. This suggests that 
alexithymia does not result from a fundamental problem 
detecting and categorizing facial or verbal emotion, 
which is inconsistent with prior research suggesting 
that alexithymic individuals are impaired on verbal and 
non-verbal recognition of external emotions per se 
(e.g. Lane et al., 1996; Lane et al., 2000; Parker et al., 
1993a). However, our face-only and word-only blocks 
may have been too easy, and our range of alexithymia 
scores may have been too small, to detect 
differences. Parker and colleagues (2005) described 
alexithymic individuals’ facial emotion impairments to 
be fairly subtle and Mueller and colleagues (2006) 
posited that their results could be attributed to their 
non-college patient sample, which had more 
pronounced emotional problems. 
Further suggesting spared processing, those 
with high alexithymia were also not impaired in the 
Emostroop effect across time bins. It is possible that 
their slower performance overall reflects a real 
underlying impairment in processing, which they 
compensated for by slowing performance to sufficiently  
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improve accuracy. However, this is unlikely given all of 
the other patterns of data in our study. The less verbal 
individuals with high alexithymia actually had enhanced 
Emostroop effects at typical durations, which suggests 
that they can and do attend to facial affect and decode 
it at a semantic level. If anything, our results could 
indicate that these individuals have a tendency to 
attend too much to negative expressions, at least at 
first.  
The possibility of alexithymics attending more 
to sad or angry information early on is consistent with 
some contradictory findings reviewed in the introduction 
and with their slowed responses on trials with sad 
words paired with sad or angry expressions in our task. 
Trait or mood induced attention to negative affect is 
known in other studies to delay responses, as in clinical 
Emotional Stroop tasks (McKenna & Sharma, 1995). 
Sad words are also typically responded to more slowly 
than angry or neutral words, likely due to embodiment 
effects (Preston & Stansfield, 2008). Perhaps our 
individuals with high alexithymia attended more to the 
sad affect, which naturally captured and slowed their 
task responses, which further augmented their overall 
slowness on the task, producing the significant 
interaction for those sad trials only. Importantly though, 
the lack of alexithymia effects specific to anger cues, 
and the significant slowing only when classifying sad 
words, undermines interpretations of alexithymia as an 
early processing deficit specific to angry or threatening 
stimuli (Mueller et al., 2006; Vermeulen et al., 2006), 
though we did not test fearful. It is possible that threat-
specific deficits only occur when sufficient arousal is 
generated by the stimuli, which may be more common 
for anger cues or tasks that present the stimuli for 
longer.  
Where null effects are involved in clinical 
populations, the sample size and severity of the 
population is always a possible issue. We did recruit 
participants with high and low TAS-20 scores, but still 
only found 19 participants with scores extreme enough 
to be considered clearly alexithymic. This was dealt 
with by using median-split analyses—which is 
commonly used in studies on alexithymia, but still could 
have limited our findings. However, the fact that we 
were able to replicate known links between alexithymia 
and lower verbal IQ, higher depression, and higher 
anxiety indicates that our participants had at least 
sufficient levels of alexithymia to produce known, 
typical relationships—relationships that still could not 
predict Emostroop performance (likely because they 
were preserved on the task anyway).  
One could try to increase the sample size 
substantially to try to find group differences on our task, 
particularly for the potentially shifted time bin effects 
between groups. However, a sample of N = 505 is 
needed for 80% power for the observed mean effect 
size within time bins—a sample that seems 
unwarranted given that we have no other indication that 
alexithymia is associated with impaired Emostroop 
performance. Despite our view that these null effects 
are real, future research could further confirm spared 
performance by recruiting more extreme candidates 
and adding clinical interviews and ancillary 
measurements of alexithymia. Measurement issues are 
particularly germane to alexithymia because, as Lane 
and colleagues pointed out, the trait is characterized by 
impairments in monitoring and identifying internal 
emotional states, particularly through verbal responses 
(Lane, Quinlan, Schwartz, Walker, & Zeitlin, 1990). 
Thus, perhaps more reliable relationships could be 
found by adding the Levels of Emotional Awareness 
Scale (Lane et al., 1990), the Toronto Structured 
Interview for Alexithymia (Bagby, Taylor, Parker, & 
Dickens, 2006), and third-party ratings from family 
(Mueller et al., 2006). 
In summary, our research does not suggest 
that alexithymia stems from early processing 
impairments in decoding others’ sad and angry facial 
expressions or sad and angry emotional words. We 
also do not find support for the idea that the disorder 
stems from early processing problems with specific 
threat-relevant cues. Given the large parallel literature 
on clinical disorders associated with alexithymia (e.g., 
irritable bowel syndrome, fibromyalgia, panic disorder), 
a parsimonious possibility is that they have difficulty 
interpreting internal feeling states as affective, as 
suggested previously by clinicians and neuroscientists 
(e.g., Lane & Schwartz, 1987; Lumley, Tomakowsky & 
Torosian, 1997; MacLean, 1949). Interoceptive 
confusion could both increase somatic complaints and 
make it difficult to recognize one’s own and others’ 
emotional states, especially for feelings that require 
significant access to internal cues, such as the arousal 
from anger and the gastric contractions from disgust. 
Such impairments would be harder to detect on tasks 
that require simple access to conceptual or emotion 
information, but would emerge on tasks that require 
access to felt, internal cues (e.g., making subtle 
affective discriminations, deciding whether one’s own 
internal state results from experienced anger/fear or a 
non-affective physiological dysfunction, deciding 
whether one feels disgust or anger). This hypothesis is 
supported by the fact that individuals with alexithymia 
do have neural differences in medial brain systems  
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(ACC, MPFC, insula) that are known to participate in 
the conscious, subjective perception and manipulation 
of emotional feeling states, even if they are not required 
to initially perceive or generate emotions (Damasio, 
1999; Lane & Schwartz, 1987; MacLean, 1949). As 
further evidence, individuals with alexithymia were 
impaired at the Iowa Gambling Task, a task designed 
to measure people’s ability to use interoceptive, 
affective cues to guide advantageous decision 
making—a deficit that was accompanied by reduced 
blood flow in the medial prefrontal cortex (Kano, Ito, & 
Fukudo, 2011). 
In the future, research should more carefully 
contrast performance on tasks that only require 
abstract processing versus explicit reference to internal 
feeling states, paying particular attention to states that 
do or do not hinge upon subtle differences in these 
feelings. Given the high utilization of the health care 
system by individuals with diffuse physical complaints 
that are difficult to diagnose, better research into these 
issues would help individuals with alexithymia as well 
as the doctors and systems designed to treat them. 
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